On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of C. S. Lewis’s death, a special annotated edition of his Christian classic, The Screwtape Letters, with notes and excerpts from his other works that help illuminate this diabolical masterpiece. Since its publication in 1942, The Screwtape Letters has sold millions of copies worldwide and is recognized as a milestone in the history of popular theology. A masterpiece of satire, it offers a sly and ironic portrayal of human life and foibles from (...) the vantage point of Screwtape, a highly placed assistant to “Our Father Below.” At once wildly comic, deadly serious, and strikingly original, The Screwtape Letters comprises the correspondence of the worldly-wise devil Screwtape and his nephew Wormwood, a novice demon in charge of securing the damnation of an ordinary young man. For the first time, The Screwtape Letters will be presented in full-text accompanied by helpful annotations in a striking two-color format. These annotations will give fans a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the popular book, providing background information, explanations of terms, historical significance, and excerpts from Lewis’s other works that more fully explain the ideas in this volume. For both expert Lewis fans and casual readers, The Screwtape Letters: Annotated Edition will be a beautiful and insightful guide to a beloved classic. (shrink)

Being able to ask others to do things, and thereby giving them reasons to do those things, is a prominent feature of our interpersonal lives. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot (...) accommodate, though it is a significant aspect of the relations that people stand in to one another, and the kinds of practical reasons that flow from those relations. (shrink)

In the modern discussions about possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the theory of definition has a fundamental importance, because the most definition’s theories hold that analytic judgments are involved by explicit definition . However, for Kant –first author who pointed out the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions–many analytic judgments are made by analysis of concepts which need not first be established by definition. Moreover, for him not all a priori knowledge is analytic. The statement that not all analytic (...) judgment is derived from definition and possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, indicates Kant didn’t believe, contrary to modern theories about analytic judgment, the definition is an essential ground of knowledge. (shrink)

Although Hans Jonas's theory of responsibility has been influential on continental European environmental ethics, his philosophy of life, which seeks to rehabilitate a teleological account of living beings and describe their differing degrees of ‘existential freedom’, is less well-known. In this article, I reconstruct the stages of Jonas's phenomenological account and address the key criticisms levelled at it. I argue that although Jonas's theory is flawed by internal contradictions, these may be rectifiable, and, if so, his philosophy of life could (...) also provide an ontological rationale for a biocentric ethic. I conclude that for these reasons his work deserves greater scholarly attention. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel version of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to try to avoid moral deference. The problem with moral deference is that it puts one in a bad position to form what I call morally worthy attitudes, i.e., non-cognitive attitudes that have moral worth in the same sense that certain actions have moral worth. Forming morally worthy attitudes requires a special sensitivity to the sufficiency of the moral reasons (...) one has to form these attitudes. However, when one defers about a moral claim, one takes it fully on trust, which entails that one is strongly disposed to not intentionally try to take precautions against believing that moral claim epistemically defectively (e.g., falsely or without sufficient justification). Thus, moral deference makes one strongly disposed to not try to acquire the sensitivity required for forming morally worthy attitudes. However, morally worthy attitudes are more valuable than merely fitting attitudes and plausibly have both final and non-final value. Thus, moral deference interferes with gaining something with final and non-final value. (shrink)

The current trajectory of artificial intelligence development suffers from fundamental epistemological shortcomings, resulting in the systematic operationalization of bias against non-white, non-male, and non-Western peoples. We argue that these failings are, in part, the result of certain Western rationalist epistemologies that exclude many ways of knowing about the world, and therefore they cannot provide a sufficient foundation on which to adequately, robustly, and humanely conceptualize intelligence. We present a new research agenda, Abundant Intelligences, an Indigenous-led, Indigenous-majority international, interdisciplinary research program (...) that imagines anew how to conceptualize and design artificial intelligence (AI) based on Indigenous knowledge (IK) systems. Abundant Intelligences draws on the rich plurality of Indigenous knowledge systems, bringing together diverse sets of thought, culture, and protocol together. We show IK systems provide one way to rebuild AI’s epistemological foundations and transform these tools’ current role in reinforcing colonial practices of exclusion, extraction, manipulation, and eradication into engines of abundance that enable us to care better for ourselves, our communities, and our world. Our proposition is to fully engage with AI to explore how different conceptions of intelligence could be embodied in these technologies. In this paper, we present the tenets of the research program in detail, account for our methodological approach, describe the impact and limitations, and conclude on a discussion of the implications of the program. (shrink)

Cette note devait introduire à un public anglophone la traduction de la « Lettre de Louis Althusser datée du 18 mars 1966 et adressée au Comité central du PCF », elle est ici enrichie dans une version livrée au public français. Elle apporte le contexte historique et théorique nécessaire à la compréhension des interventions « anti-humanistes » de Louis Althusser qui questionne les choix politiques opérés par le PCF au cours des années 1960. Nulle part ailleurs, dans les écrits publiés (...) d’Althusser, nous ne voyons aussi clairement les enjeux politiques imbriqués dans son projet philosophique, ni comment ce projet évolua progressivement d’une entreprise « théoriciste » à la recherche d’une philosophie en lien plus étroit avec la pratique. Cette lettre nous paraît de la plus haute importance pour les spécialistes de l’œuvre d’Althusser, les historiens de la pensée marxiste, mais aussi plus largement à tous ceux qui s’intéressent à l’importance que peut revêtir le travail d’Althusser dans les débats actuels dans le champ de la philosophie marxiste. (shrink)

A guide to retelling your personal, family, and cultural stories to transform your life, your relationships, and the world [bullet] Applies the latest neuroscience research on memory, brain mapping, and brain plasticity to the field of narrative therapy [bullet] Details mind-mapping and narrative therapy techniques that use story to change behavior patterns in ourselves, our relationships, and our communities [bullet] Explores how narrative therapy can help replace dysfunctional cultural stories with ones that build healthier relationships with each other and the (...) planet We are born into a world of stories that quickly shapes our behavior and development without our conscious awareness. By retelling our personal, family, and cultural narratives we can transform the patterns of our own lives as well as the patterns that shape our communities and the larger social worlds in which we interact. Applying the latest neuroscience research on memory, brain mapping, and brain plasticity to the field of narrative therapy, Lewis Mehl-Madrona and Barbara Mainguy explain how the brain is specialized in the art of story-making and story-telling. They detail mind-mapping and narrative therapy techniques that use story to change behavior patterns in ourselves, our relationships, and our communities. They explore studies that reveal how memory works through story, how the brain recalls things in narrative rather than lists, and how our stories modify our physiology and facilitate health or disease. Drawing on their decades of experience in narrative therapy, the authors examine the art of helping people to change their story, providing brain-mapping practices to discover your inner storyteller and test if the stories you are living are functional or dysfunctional, healing or destructive. They explain how to create new characters and new stories, ones that excite you, help you connect with yourself, and deepen your intimate connections with others. Detailing how shared stories and language form culture, the authors also explore how narrative therapy can help replace dysfunctional cultural stories with those that offer templates for healthier relationships with each other and the planet. (shrink)

First published in 1994. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the way humans interact with domestic companion animals, with a focus on ‘positive reward-based training’ methods, particularly for dogs. From a biosemiotic perspective, I discuss the role of animal training in today’s society and examine what binary reward- based reinforcement schedules communicate, semiotically. I also examine the extent to which reward-based training methods promote better welfare, when compared to the more traditional methods which rely on aversive stimuli and punishment, if and when they are relied (...) upon excessively. I conclude that when used as the primary means of communication, they have the potential to be detrimental to animal welfare, because the underlying social signal is control and resource dominance. As an alternative view to behaviourist-based learning theory and conditioning, I outline how enactivist theories of cognition support a semiotic approach to interspecific human-animal communication. I therefore propose a move toward a dynamic semiosis and mutual understanding based upon Peirce’s phenomenology, resulting in a more balanced merging of Umwelten. The aim is to create rich and more complex semiospheres around humans and domestic animals, which allow for individual agency and autonomy. (shrink)

This article argues that environmental ethics can deemphasize environmental problem-solving in preference for a more exemplarist mode. This mode will renarrate what we admire in those we have long admired, in order to make them resonate with contemporary ethical needs. First, I outline a method problem that arose for me in ethnographic fieldwork, a problem that I call, far too reductively, “solution thinking.” Second, I relate that method problem to movements against “quandary ethics” in ethical theory more broadly. Third, I (...) discuss some interpretive work I am engaged in about Henry David Thoreau and how it bears on the methodological issues my fieldwork raised. I argue that some of the most important icons of right relation to environment, especially Francis of Assisi and Thoreau, should be envisioned as far more politically invested than they usually are. They demonstrate to scholars of religious ethics that an exemplarist ethic focused on character need not neglect politics. (shrink)

This book develops a rights-based theory of justice that maintains that genuine repentance creates a right to be forgiven. Examining the nature of rights and theological conceptions of forgiveness, the author shows why such a right is nonrepugnant and produces the most just state of affairs for victims and wrongdoers.

Much attention has been devoted in recent years to the personal idealism of Martin Luther King, Jr. Among the major contributors to the scholarship in this area is Rufus Burrow, Jr., who places King firmly in the tradition of personal idealism, or personalism, while also uncovering the intellectual unease that made King both a deep and creative thinker and a committed and effective social activist.1 Clearly, Burrow's own sense of his role as a personalist informs his approach to the life (...) and thought of King. Although philosophical personalism figures prominently in Burrow's treatment of King in his writings, ethical and social personalism provides the primary theoretical framework for both Burrow's exploration of .. (shrink)

In order to develop his pragmatist and inferentialist framework, Robert Brandom appropriates, reconstructs and revises key themes in German Idealism such as the self-legislation of norms, the social institution of concepts and facts, a norm-oriented account of being and the critique of representationalist accounts of meaning and truth. However, these themes have an essential ethical dimension, one that Brandom has not explicitly acknowledged. For Hegel, the determination of norms and facts and the institution of normative statuses take place in the (...) context of Sittlichkeit (‘ethical life’). By engaging with some of the more ontologically and ethically substantive points raised by Hegel, I argue that, from a Hegelian perspective, Brandom’s project regarding the social determination of truth and meaning cannot be divorced from ethics, specifically, the ethical dimension of social recognition. Furthermore, I argue that, in real situations (as opposed to ideal ones), claims to normative authority cannot be considered independently from the legitimacy of those claims, a legitimacy that Brandom is unable to reasonably explain. Finally, I argue that a Hegelian solution to the problems facing Brandom’s framework calls into question the unity of reason that is at the core of Brandom’s normative pragmatics and inferential semantics. (shrink)

This chapter explains the “progressive elaboration” of Louis Althusser’s philosophy in relation to materialism. First, it shows the way in which Althusser’s thinking about materialism, Marxism, Marx’s materialism, and the correct materialism for Marxism had its roots in earlier Marxist reflection on the metaphysics of matter and science. Second, it demonstrates how Althusser’s materialism changed over time. In broad terms, this change can be described as the transition from a Marxist materialism that fully endorsed dialectical logic to one that denied (...) dialectical logic and ontology in the name of a materialism of chance and for the sake of Marxist politics. Another way of stating this is that, gradually, Althusser began to see Historical Materialism as that which is essential to Marxism and Dialectical Materialism as that “horror” which compromised the Marxist movement both theoretically and practically. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel version of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have _pro tanto_ reason to try to avoid moral deference. The problem with moral deference is that it puts one in a bad position to form what I call morally worthy attitudes, i.e., non-cognitive attitudes that have moral worth in the same sense that certain actions have moral worth. Forming morally worthy attitudes requires a special sensitivity to the sufficiency of the moral reasons (...) one has to form these attitudes. However, when one defers about a moral claim, one takes it fully on trust, which entails that one is strongly disposed to not intentionally try to take precautions against believing that moral claim epistemically defectively (e.g., falsely or without sufficient justification). Thus, moral deference makes one strongly disposed to not try to acquire the sensitivity required for forming morally worthy attitudes. However, morally worthy attitudes are more valuable than merely fitting attitudes and plausibly have both final and non-final value. Thus, moral deference interferes with gaining something with final and non-final value. (shrink)

Moral distress is reported to be a critical force contributing to intensifying rates of anxiety, depression and burnout experienced by healthcare workers. In this paper, we examine the moral dilemmas and ensuing distress personally and collectively experienced by healthcare workers while caring for patients during the pandemic. Data are drawn from free-text responses from a cross-sectional national online survey of Australian healthcare workers about the patient care challenges they faced. Three themes were derived from qualitative content analysis that illuminated the (...) ways in which moral dilemmas and distress were relationally experienced by healthcare workers: (1) the moral ambiguity of how to care well for patients amid a rapidly changing work environment; (2) the distress of witnessing suffering shared between healthcare workers and patients; and (3) the distress of performing new forms of invisible work in the absence of institutional recognition. These findings reveal that moral distress was a strongly shared experience. Findings advance understandings of moral distress as a relational experience, collectively felt, constituted, and experienced by healthcare workers. Considering how to harness collective solidarity in effectively responding to moral distress experienced across the frontline healthcare workforce is critical. (shrink)

Background Moral distress is reported to be a critical force contributing to intensifying rates of anxiety, depression and burnout experienced by healthcare workers. In this paper, we examine the moral dilemmas and ensuing distress personally and collectively experienced by healthcare workers while caring for patients during the pandemic. Methods Data are drawn from free-text responses from a cross-sectional national online survey of Australian healthcare workers about the patient care challenges they faced. Results Three themes were derived from qualitative content analysis (...) that illuminated the ways in which moral dilemmas and distress were relationally experienced by healthcare workers: (1) the moral ambiguity of how to care well for patients amid a rapidly changing work environment; (2) the distress of witnessing suffering shared _between_ healthcare workers and patients; and (3) the distress of performing new forms of invisible work in the absence of institutional recognition. These findings reveal that moral distress was a strongly shared experience. Conclusions Findings advance understandings of moral distress as a relational experience, collectively felt, constituted, and experienced by healthcare workers. Considering how to harness collective solidarity in effectively responding to moral distress experienced across the frontline healthcare workforce is critical. (shrink)

This article challenges and reevaluates the model of the domesticated, invisible Roman woman, and seeks out the relationships between female visibility, religion, and urban spaces in Republican Rome. I adopt an intersectional approach to female visibility, focusing especially on religious rites, temporality, and on status symbols. I argue that women of various backgrounds used and were visible in numerous urban spaces, drawing on instances of their regular and episodic female religious activity, and on matronal vehicles and mobility privileges. At times, (...) the Urbs was visibly female. (shrink)

This article is a reflective essay, drawing upon insights on racism and related forms of oppression as expressions of bad faith, on several influential movements in contemporary philosophy of race and racism. The author pays particular attention to theories from the global south addressing contemporary debates ranging from Euromodernity, philosophical anthropology, and the racialization of First Nations or Amerindians to intersectionality theory, discourses on privilege, decolonization, and creolization.

Wakefield doesn't mind my focus on parallels between addiction and love. But love can fall outside the bounds of what evolution intended. So, he claims, comparing addiction with love does not preclude a naturally defined "disorder." I counter with the argument that evolution handed us such highly general response systems, the bounds of normality cannot be defined.